Suez 2.0?: The Houthis v. International Shipping
The geopolitics of 1956 can feel ancient, but, 67 years later, history may be repeating itself.
The biggest geopolitical story of 2023 is, inarguably, in my opinion, the Hamas attack of October 7 and its aftermath: the ongoing war in Gaza. That story has gathered in various other strands – the rise of Iran in the region, Israeli internal politics, American partisanship and the Middle East – while spinning out other yarns – the cross-border tensions with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the impact on the potential Arab-Israeli warming, the response of the Egyptian government to Palestinian refugees, and the further moral depravity of the United Nations. But the most significant of those subsidiary tales has thus far been the Houthi assault on commerce in the Red Sea. That story is already making an enormous impact across the world and could signal far greater issues in the future.
So, who are the Houthis and what are they doing in the region that is causing such wide-ranging effects?
The Houthis are a Shia Islamist revolutionary movement, backed financially and militarily by Iran, that has controlled large swathes of Yemen since the outbreak of that nation’s civil war in 2014. They are one of Tehran’s foremost proxies and have been working assiduously to undermine and weaken the Gulf Arab states against whom they’ve waged a years-long war. The Houthis have attacked American troops based in the Middle East, launched ballistic missiles at Riyadh, and taken hold of key cities and ports on the Yemeni coast. The civil war they’ve been fighting for nearly a decade has culminated in a stalemate, with very little ability for either internal faction to overcome their foe without extensive external assistance – in the Houthi case, provided by the Iranian government.
Since the Hamas barbarities of October, the Houthis have ramped up their assaults on maritime trade in the region. Yemen is situated astride one of the most important shipping corridors on the planet, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait which links the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. This eighteen-mile-wide chokepoint controls access to the fastest route between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal, a passage by which 22,000 ships, accounting for twelve percent of global trade, pass annually. The next-fastest sea route to Europe from Asia rounds Africa via the Cape of Good Hope, nearly doubling the mileage – and more than doubling the cost – of the Suez route.
These ships carry valuable cargo: electronic goods, automobiles, fuel oil, and other key commodities. Closing the Suez route puts Europe back nearly two centuries in terms of receiving key Asian trade goods. In the interim, the reliance on the Canal has become nearly total; just look at the issues presented by the 2021 Ever Given incident to see how. American interests are also implicated in any challenges to the Suez route – as they are in general when the freedom of the seas is threatened. We’ve been interested in open maritime navigation and commerce since the nation’s founding. Our earliest military expeditions as an independent state were against piratical commerce raiders. We’ve fought against interdiction of transnational shipping for nearly 250 years. Suffice it to say, the free navigation of the waters of the world – the Red Sea included – is paramount to any rational conception of US national interests.
Given an advantageous geographical position and the right weaponry, bad actors can easily disrupt global shipping in the tight waterway leading to the Red Sea. Large modern merchant ships, despite their high value, have a limited crew and barebones armament. Their ability to evade attack is extremely poor due to their size and lack of maneuverability. They can be hijacked by well-armed militants from the sea or air, as well as targeted by land-based batteries. Harming or even credibly threatening these ships would drastically increase insurance rates, forcing a switch to the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. This would increase the cost of shipping, impacting the prices of goods and causing shortages. And this is exactly the playbook from which the Houthis are operating.
During the Biden administration, the Houthis have grown increasingly powerful, aided significantly by American policy. For most of the raging civil war in Yemen, the Arab anti-Houthi coalition had American support, but this changed after Biden’s inauguration. That support was explicitly withheld in order to punish the Saudis and appease Iran, making the anti-Houthi fight far more challenging. Weapons transfers and sales were paused, if not entirely shut down. Diplomatic cover was ostentatiously removed. The Saudis in particular were treated as pariahs – until the price of gas rose. Still, the Biden team has held these Gulf states at far more than arm’s length. At the same time, the State Department removed the Houthis from the list of terrorist organizations, another major coup for Tehran’s regional strategy. Now, after years of uncontested arms transfers from Iran, the Yemeni group is attempting to strike at Israel during the war in Gaza – something only possible because of long-range Iranian weaponry and Tehran’s pecuniary and diplomatic support.
To counter this malign force attempting to close off global shipping and widen the war against Israel, the United States has moved multiple warships into the region. This force is meant as a deterrent against Iran and its proxies, notably Lebanese Hezbollah, allowing for rapid American response to any attack. But there have been precious few responses, despite the sizable number of attacks. Instead, these vessels have only served as targets for the Houthi terrorists. American destroyers have been doing manful work shooting down drones and missiles launched from Yemen, but there has been no retaliation against the attackers. Houthi bases have been left intact, their ammunition stores totally untouched, and their malicious launches undeterred. Even when failing to hit their targets, the Houthis are succeeding: each of their projectiles costs a fraction of our missile interceptors, and each requires at least two interceptors to guarantee its destruction. The Houthis, in conjunction with Iran, are imposing significant financial costs on our Navy. In an era where stockpiles are running short across the West, this is an untenable situation.
But there may be a solution on the horizon. The US recently announced Operation Prosperity Guardian, a 10-nation maritime coalition to protect cargo ships and deter future Houthi attacks. Apparently, other nations have signed on as well, but they wish to remain anonymous – not exactly a sign of optimism. There has been no information about rules of engagement, red lines, or potential retaliatory strikes, making the announcement something of a dud. Since then, several of our allies have left Prosperity Guardian, refusing to follow American leadership in a mission that we have traditionally captained. This new effort comes on top of the existing regional anti-piracy coalition, which has entirely botched its mission, allowing Houthi assaults and failing to aid stricken commercial vessels. (Note: China has been quite obviously refusing aid requests, showing their cards when it comes to commitment to the world order.) In the days since the announcement, the Houthis have continued their assault, causing most major global lines to avoid the Red Sea route. Their leader has declared American warships legitimate targets, while missiles continue to be launched at Israel with impunity. None of this has merited a serious response from the Biden administration. If this continues, American power and prestige could take a potentially mortal wound.
History offers a cautionary tale in that regard. Interestingly enough, it happens to have occurred in the same Middle Eastern waters. The Suez Crisis of 1956 was a similarly shambolic, disastrous intervention by Western powers in an attempt to re-open maritime lanes and secure their free navigation. It irreparably damaged the reputation of the former world hegemon and spelled doom for its prestige abroad – crippling its ability to independently achieve its national aims and protect its interests. It is a situation well worth studying in today’s chaotic moment.
The Suez Crisis has a long backstory, one far too involved delve into here. Realistically, it goes back to the creation of the Canal by the French in the mid-19th century and its subsequent purchase by the British under Disraeli in 1875. Since then, the Suez route has been the lifeline of European commerce, dramatically shortening maritime journeys and proving strategically crucial through two world wars. In 1956, that lifeline was threatened in a novel and dangerous way. In short, Egypt’s new nationalist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, seized the Canal against the wishes of its majority shareholders – many of whom were British and French. He sought to control access, charging tolls to fund major infrastructure projects to modernize Egypt and limiting use by ‘unfriendly’ interests. This was anathema to the Europeans, so they conspired with another enemy of Egypt, Israel, to retake the Canal and overturn Nasser’s government.
Israel had fought off an enormous Arab invasion less than a decade earlier and had major issues with Egypt, including Nasser’s decision to close off the Straits of Tiran, essentially isolating Israel’s south. Their objectives were more limited and achievable than those of the Europeans, as well as being more central to the national interest. While the British and French were fighting to retain geopolitical status against a deliberate humiliation, Israel was fighting for the very ability to exist as a nation within its internationally-recognized borders. These varying objectives and motivations dramatically impacted the conflict to come. Israel invaded first, followed by the Europeans – falsely claiming they had no prior knowledge of the Israeli operation – to ‘secure’ the Canal. These military objectives were achieved, but at immense reputational cost for the British and French. The United Nations, led by the United States and Soviet Union, lambasted the invasion and forced its conclusion within only a few months. The joint effort of the two superpowers, something of a rarity in 1956, spelled doom for the European-Israeli force.
The British and French crawled back to Europe, tails firmly between their legs; the Israelis were somewhat triumphant, forcing the Egyptians into opening the Tiran Straits and saving southern Israel from disaster. The crisis ended the political career of Winston Churchill’s protégé, then-Prime Minister Anthony Eden, disgracing the once-promising statesman. The debacle, which was eminently foreseeable given the clear messaging of the Eisenhower administration against the Anglo-French effort, cost the Europeans their status as preeminent geopolitical players. Despite remaining on the UN Security Council, the British and French have never recovered the prestige they squandered on the shores of Suez. The crisis spelled the end of completely independent European geopolitics in the Cold War, firmly suborning their interests to those of the broader West as united under the American security umbrella. The British Empire was already in terminal decline, but Suez was truly the killing blow.
Clearly, the Suez Crisis of 1956 was catastrophic for the British. It was a failure from start to finish and put the final nail in the coffin of British preeminence overseas. It also has a conspicuous echo in the current problem we face in the same Red Sea littoral.
First of all, there are obvious geographic similarities. Both 1956 and 2023 involve Israel; Egypt’s seizure of the Canal and closure of the Tiran was meant to harm Israel, while the Houthi attacks on shipping are directed against Israel and its allies during the current Gaza war. In 1956, the crisis revolved around the Suez Canal itself, as well as the Straits of Tiran at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. Today, the situation exists at the opposite end of the Red Sea by the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, but it implicates the approaches to Suez just as deeply as did its predecessor. Both of the crises rest on control of key maritime chokepoints which serve the same purpose: arresting international commercial traffic along the key sea lanes from Asia to Europe. In a more profound sense, cutting off these chokepoints threatens the heart of the world system as it has existed for over 200 years – free navigation of the open oceanic commons.
Both the British in the 1950s and America today are intensely interested in that world system and the mare liberum concept which underlies it. Free trade between polities made both of those nations great; it has increased national prosperity, standard of living, global influence, and innovation. Neither Britain in 1956 nor America in 2023 would be the powers they are without the immense benefits of the global trading system. Naval power and the policing of the seas which goes along with it have been the hallmarks of British and American international strength for centuries. Before the US took on the role as guarantor of the free seas, the UK held that title and the responsibilities – and benefits – that come along with it. Failing to guard legitimate commerce against acts of piracy or interdiction by sovereign states shows the hegemonic power as something of a paper tiger, which can have serious deleterious effects.
So much of international relations is based on confidence and belief. Changes in those beliefs can destroy the image needed to credibly project power abroad. When London was shown to be a pushover at Suez, it rapidly snowballed, accelerating the loss of Empire and cementing the nation’s new status as a junior partner to Washington. If we fail today to show ourselves as a power worthy of respect and fear, our consequences could be far worse. America faces a set of drastic challenges in the 21st century, from enemies like Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, across nearly all geostrategic theaters. Each failure of willpower or deterrence leads to more testing and further opportunities for disaster, each compounding on itself and undermining American status. In this way, all of these challenges are linked; problems in one theater can easily influence actors in another. Of course, it certainly makes it all the more difficult when one’s enemies are aligned, which is the case today.
Another similarity between the crises in the Red Sea is the collapse of deterrence. Britain, despite signaling against an Egyptian takeover of the Canal, failed to dissuade Nasser from his big move. Instead, Cairo thumbed its nose at London and went ahead with the nationalization, believing – correctly, as it would turn out – that the superpowers would not take kindly to the British reaction. Now, the Houthis have deliberately chosen to ignore American warnings, knowing the reprisals would be slim to none. Indeed, since the beginning of Prosperity Guardian, their attacks have ramped up in scale and intensity. This textbook failure of deterrence also impacts alliance relationships. In 1956, it lost Britain the support of America and caused friction with France; this greatly diminished the UK’s geostrategic heft. Now, we may lose the support of our European allies if we continue to be so noncommittal and weak in our response to clear aggression against our mutual interests.
Britain and America also had to deal with these crises under less-than-ideal leaders. Even though both Eden and Biden came into high office with a great deal of foreign policy experience and powerful political benefactors – Churchill and Obama, respectively – neither was up to the task at hand. Eden was constitutionally incapable of handling the stress and acting decisively in the face of confusion and opposition, while Biden is senile and almost always has the exact wrong instincts when it comes to issues abroad. Eden was more competent than Biden is, but he had a tougher geopolitical situation given Britain’s progressive decline. The inability to meet the moment was disastrous for Eden politically; we shall see how this moment impacts Biden’s reelection bid in 2024.
The fate of the British after Suez was calamitous for that proud nation’s geopolitical status and its ability to act overseas in a unilateral fashion. We face much the same test today. But our decline would not merely impact our own nation; it would spell the end of the world order as we know it. There is no allied power with shared interests waiting in the wings to take hold of the torch. There is no stronger nation that also desires and benefits from the free navigation of the seas, while having the naval power to protect it. The nations champing at the bit to assert their own geopolitical might seek the opposite of a free sea; they desire a mercantilist world where sea lanes and international trade are tightly controlled on a regional basis. This would be a full-on replacement of the world system, rewinding the globe to an era of great conflict and impoverished populations. If we seek to avoid that horrific outcome, we must stand up now. We are steaming inexorably toward dire straits, but thankfully the current problem is nothing that cannot be solved by a large number of Tomahawk missiles. What we lack is the will to use them.